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1  Analytic Theology and Liberation Theology 
 
The open secret of analytic philosophy of religion since its 20th century revival 
has been that it is for the most part a revival of philosophical theology, and particularly 
Christian philosophical theology.2  More recently, Christian analytic philosophers and 
theologians sympathetic to them have transformed this open secret into a research 
program by explicitly thematizing the use of analytic philosophical tools for the particular 
work of Christian theology.   Dubbing this work as “analytic theology” (hereafter, AT) 
and editing an eponymous volume on the subject,3 Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea have 
succeeded in inaugurating AT as a distinct subregion in the philosophy of religion.  
Besides prompting a spate of first-rate philosophical work theorizing a variety of 
Christian theological commitments, the advent of AT has also prompted a good deal of 
meta-theological reflection:  What kinds of theology are ruled out by the methodological 
commitments of AT?  Is AT more conducive for certain conceptions of Christian 
theology than others?4   
 
 A casual glance at the AT literature would suggest that AT has been most 
conducive to generating traditional and orthodox Christian theology and least conducive 
to generating the revisionary projects of liberation theology (hereafter, LT).  As William 
Wood observes, we can distinguish between the “formal model” of AT and its actual 
manifestation as a research program.  Formally speaking, 
 
                                                        
1 I would like to thank Michelle Panchuk, Michael Rea, and Kevin Timpe for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper.   
2 For a qualitative demographic study of the religious constituency of analytic philosophy of 
religion, see Helen de Cruz at http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/2013/12/31/results-of-myqualitative-study-
of-attitudes-and-religious-motivations-of-philosophers-of-religion, as well as the PhilPapers survey 
conducted by David Bourget and David Chalmers at http://fragments.consc.net/djc/2010/11/more-
philpapers-surveyresults.html.  In William Wood’s “Trajectories, Traditions, and Tools in Analytic 
Theology” Journal of Analytic Theology 4 (2016), Wood summarizes the data as follows: “On the best data 
that we have, approximately 70 percent of philosophers of religion are theists, and about 58 percent identify 
as Christians. By contrast, among philosophers in general, about 73 percent identify as atheists.” (258, f.n. 
8).   
3 Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, eds., Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).   
4 This question is raised perhaps most strikingly and controversially by Randall Rauser’s 
“Theology as a Bull Session,” in Analytic Theology, eds. Crisp and Rea, wherein he suggests that analytic 
theology is a safeguard against “academic bullshit” in theology (71).  However, the task of discerning 
which ways of doing theology are excluded by norms of AT has been taken up less polemically via, e.g., 
Rea’s engagement with Merold Westphal in “Introduction,” Analytic Theology, 9-15 or Marilyn McCord 
Adams’s “What’s Wrong with the Ontological Error?” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 1-12. 
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a theologian does not need to adhere to any substantive theological or 
philosophical views in order to count as an analytic theologian.  She only 
needs to explicate whatever substantive views she does hold using the tools 
and methods of analytic philosophy.5  
 
However, when one looks at the existing literature in AT to see how the formal model is 
actually being enacted, the empirical reality one discovers is  
 
a substantive theological program: theology that draws on the tools and 
methods of analytic philosophy to advance a specific theological agenda, 
one that is, broadly speaking, associated with traditional Christian 
orthodoxy.6   
 
By “traditional Christian orthodoxy,” Wood seems to have in mind something like 
“conciliar” or “creedal” Christianity.  However, the theological association of AT with 
traditional orthodoxy in that sense may be construing AT too narrowly.  It is more 
accurate, I think, to say that AT has been associated with traditional Christian orthodoxy 
in a broader sense that encompasses the literatures and debates of the mainstream 
Western European and American theological canon – one that does not exclude figures 
often credited (or debited) with breaking from the creedal and conciliar tradition, such as 
Schleiermacher, Bultmann or Tillich.   
 
LT, on the other hand is characterized by a critical posture toward the established 
Western theological canon, not only in its maintenance of a generally theologically 
conservative Christianity but also in its more traditionally liberal revisions, insofar as 
both that conservative tradition and its liberal revisions can be thought to mediate various 
forms of social and political injustice and oppression.7 But one finds it difficult to find 
any monographs or articles intuitively recognizable as instances of AT that have as their 
primary purpose to substantially engage the positions, literatures, or debates that define 
contemporary LT.   At best, there have been a few analytic theologians (Sarah Coakley 
chief among them) who have broached the concerns of feminist theology from within that 
traditional theological canon.8   Nevertheless, there remains no discernible strand of AT 
                                                        
5  Wood, “Trajectories,” 255.    
6 Ibid.  
7 Devin Singh follows Jon Sobrino in distinguishing two distinct philosophical trajectories in the 
Western tradition: the more dominant one that runs from Kant to various post-Kantian projects, and the less 
dominant one that runs from Marx to various radical social and political philosophies.  Whereas Christian 
theology and philosophy of religion has tracked with the various developments of the post-Kantian legacy, 
liberation theology (particularly in its Latin American instantiation) has found a greater resource in Marxist 
thought.  See Singh, “Liberation Theology,” in The Epistemology of Theology, edited by William Abraham 
and Fred Aquino (New York: Oxford University Press), 552. 
8 See Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2002); God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay “On the Trinity’ (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  On my reading, Coakley’s significance as a feminist theologian consists precisely 
in her creative attempts to construct a Christian feminism normed by orthodox Christian theological 
traditions (especially those retrospectively identified as “Christian mysticism”).  As a traditionalist of sorts, 
her feminist credentials are often subject to scrutiny by Christian feminist theologians who take up a critical 
Forthcoming in Marginalized Identities, Peripheral Theologies: Expanding Conversations in 
Analytic Theology, edited by Michelle Panchuk and Michael Rea (Oxford University Press). 
3-6-2019 Draft, please do not cite without prior permission.  
 
3 
 
that contributes centrally to the current state of black or womanist theologies, more 
critical and revisionary feminist theologies, queer theologies, or any other radical social 
and political theologies.   
 
The lacuna is striking, because the development of AT from its forbearers in 
analytic philosophy of religion has managed to generate fruitful engagement with a host 
of other movements in academic theology.  The growth of AT has, for instance, 
generated many works of confessional or ecclesial theology including evangelical,9 
Reformed,10 liberal Protestant,11 and Roman Catholic theologies.12  Analytic theologians 
have emerged from amongst various theological orientations — there are prominent 
analytic Thomists,13 analytic Calvinists,14 analytic Barthians,15 Schleimeracherians,16 and 
more.  Analytic theologians have accordingly waded into various meta-theological 
debates over the proper aims, methods and sources in theology as these are construed in 
conservative,17 liberal,18 and post-liberal theology.19   Why, then, given this impressive 
and ambitious intellectual market-share in contemporary academic theology, have 
analytic theologians by and large failed to so much as engage or assess — much less 
generate — any substantial LT?  Why should one-thousand other analytic theological 
flowers bloom while this one has not even begun to bud?   
 
One suggestion might be that AT and LT are simply incompatible with one 
another.  Perhaps what Wood calls the “formal model” of AT logically excludes or makes 
very unlikely something essential to the project of LT.   To assess whether there is any 
such incompatibility, we need working definitions of AT and LT.  Michael Rea’s account 
of AT has been perhaps the most widely endorsed.  Rea emphasizes that AT is not 
adequately characterized by any shared substantive philosophical theses in analytic 
philosophy that all analytic theologians endorse as such, because there are no such theses.  
                                                        
stance toward those traditions as more corrupted by patriarchy than Coakley allows.  See, e.g., Anna 
Mercedes’s Power For: Feminism and Christ’s Self-Giving (New York: T&T Clark, 2011), or Linn 
Tonstad, God and Difference: The Trinity, Sexuality and the Transformation of Finitude (New York: 
Routledge Press, 2017).  
9 See, e.g., Thomas McCall’s An Invitation to Analytic Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2015). 
10 See, e.g., Oliver D. Crisp, Deviant Calvinism: Broadening Reformed Theology (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2014).   
11 See e.g., Andrew Dole, Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural Order (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
12 See e.g., Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016.  
13 For example, John Haldane, Bruce Marshall, Eleonore Stump 
14 For example, Oliver Crisp, Ray Yeo. 
15 For example, Kevin Diller, Alan Torrance. 
16 For example, Robert Adams, Andrew Dole. 
17 See, e.g., McCall, An Invitation to Analytic Theology.  
18 See, e.g., William Wood, “Analytic Theology as Liberal Theology,” paper presented at Fuller 
Theological Seminary’s Colloquium in Analytic Theology, Pasadena, CA: April 12, 2017. 
19 See, e.g., Sameer Yadav, “Christian Doctrine as Ontological Commitment to a Narrative,” in 
The Task of Dogmatics: Explorations in Theological Method (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 70-86. 
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Rather, AT is just any sort of theology that adopts the ambitions and the style broadly 
exhibited in contemporary analytic philosophy.  Those ambitions are 
 
(i) to identify the scope and limits of our powers to obtain knowledge of the 
world, and (ii) to provide such true explanatory theories as we can in areas 
of inquiry (metaphysics, morals and the like) that fall outside the scope of 
the natural sciences.20  
  
In addition to these ambitions, Rea characterizes AT as rhetorically conforming to five 
stylistic prescriptions widely exhibited in contemporary analytic philosophy: 
 
P1. Write as if philosophical positions and conclusions can be adequately 
formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated. 
P2. Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence. 
P3. Avoid substantive (non-decorative) use of metaphor and other tropes 
whose semantic content outstrips their propositional content. 
P4. Work as much as possible with well-understood primitive concepts, and 
concepts that can be analyzed in terms of those. 
P5. Treat conceptual analysis (insofar as it is possible) as a source of 
evidence.21 
 
The virtues of Rea’s way of identifying AT include its minimalism, its success in 
capturing our intuitions about what might rightly be judged to be instances of AT, and 
despite its minimalism its nonetheless managing to say something substantive about what 
makes AT distinct from non-analytic ways of doing theology.  It is also important to note 
that Rea’s analysis aims to be descriptive, not normative — it does not attempt to 
prescribe what AT ought to be, but only to plausibly describe what it is.   Offering a 
similarly virtuous descriptive definition of LT that can capture whatever it is that unites 
all liberation theologians across all of the width and depth of their mutual disagreements 
would be a difficult undertaking.  Just as there are no substantive philosophical theses 
shared by all analytic theologians, there are likewise no substantive theses regarding the 
proper subjects, grounds, means or methods of LT among liberation theologians.  
Nevertheless, LT can similarly be marked out in terms of a shared ambition in theology, 
as well as two shared meta-theological commitments about the normative role played by 
that ambition in theological theorizing.   
 
 The defining feature of LT is the commitment to a liberative ambition in theology, 
which can be summarized as the ambition to do theology in service of the cognitive and 
practical goals of securing freedom for groups who suffer social or political oppression.  
A key feature of LT, however, is that this ambition is intended to serve not merely as a 
psychological motivator for liberation theologians or as a mere moral scruple, but as a 
meta-theological norm for theology as such. On some explications of the liberative norm 
for theology, a liberative ambition must be satisfied in order for any putative instance of 
                                                        
20 Rea, “Introduction,” in Analytic Theology, 4.   
21 Ibid., 5-6.  
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theology to genuinely count as theology at all.  Thus, for example, we find James Cone (a 
founding figure of black liberation theology) claiming that “there can be no Christian 
theology that is not identified unreservedly with those who are humiliated and 
abused…Christian theology is never just a rational study of the being of God.  Rather it is 
a study of God’s liberating activity in the world, God’s activity in [sic] behalf of the 
oppressed.”22 
 
 Cone appears to take the liberative ambition of LT to be a defining norm for 
Christian theology in the strong sense of imposing a condition that must be satisfied for 
the term “Christian theology” to be properly reference-fixing.  Any putative instance of 
Christian theology that fails to live up to a liberative ambition is thus not an instance of 
Christian theology at all, but merely a Christian theology manqué.  This meta-theological 
thesis about a liberative ambition in theology makes “Christian theology” a success term, 
such that the designative meaning of the term includes only that which satisfies that 
ambition.  But not all liberation theologians make a liberative ambition normative for the 
meaning of “theology” per se. Some take that ambition to instead be a merely evaluative 
norm that determines whether any instance of theology counts as an instance of good 
theology, theology done well, properly, or as it ought to be done.  On this weaker 
reading, there can be Christian theology that is “just a rational study of the being of 
God,” and which is not essentially concerned with “God’s liberating activity in the 
world,” but Christian theology of that sort, in virtue of failing to satisfy a liberative 
ambition, is bad theology, theology poorly executed.23   
 
 As a matter of descriptive definition, I leave open the question of whether we 
ought to accept the stronger or the weaker reading of the meta-theological role that a 
liberative norm plays for LT – this seems to be an in-house debate among liberation 
theologians.  There is much greater agreement, however, about the domains to which a 
liberative norm must be applied in order to satisfy a liberative ambition in theology.  
Namely, for any instance of theology to count as an instance of LT, it must serve the 
interest of securing freedom for a socially or politically oppressed group in two ways: (a) 
substantively and (b) methodologically.  Theology exhibits a substantive interest in 
liberation only when its subject-matter is normatively determined by a liberative 
ambition, while it exhibits a methodological interest in liberation only when its mode of 
inquiry is normatively determined by a liberative ambition.  Various kinds of LT are 
individuated by the forms of political and social oppression that substantively and 
methodologically motivate their theological theorizing.  
 
 In his Invitation to Analytic Theology, Thomas McCall claims that “there is 
nothing about analytic theology…that precludes the use of analytic tools by, say, 
feminist, womanist, or liberationist theologies.”24  Given that we take him to be referring 
                                                        
22 James Hal Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 1, 3. 
23 See, for example, Margaret Kamitsuka’s allowance for an internal dispute among feminist 
liberation theologians regarding what I’m calling strong and weak readings of the liberative norm in 
Feminist Theology and the Challenge of Difference (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 117ff.   
24 McCall, Invitation, 29.   
Forthcoming in Marginalized Identities, Peripheral Theologies: Expanding Conversations in 
Analytic Theology, edited by Michelle Panchuk and Michael Rea (Oxford University Press). 
3-6-2019 Draft, please do not cite without prior permission.  
 
6 
 
to what Wood calls the “formal model” of AT, and given the minimalistic formal 
definitions of AT and LT above, it should be clear enough that McCall is correct.  There 
is nothing about the liberative ambition of LT or its proposed normative role for 
theological content and method that contradicts Rea’s ambitions (i) or (ii), or any of his 
stylistic prescriptions P1-P5.  It remains possible, of course, that there are liberation 
theologians who construe the kind of freedom from oppression constitutive of their 
theological theorizing in some way that runs contrary to the analytic ambitions or style 
constitutive of AT.  For example, perhaps there are liberation theologians who embrace 
LT but who also think that trying to determine the scope and limits of our powers to 
obtain knowledge of the world is inconsistent with the explication of liberation for the 
oppressed. In that case such a construal of LT would be incompatible with AT in virtue 
of excluding one of the ambitions it adopts from analytic philosophy, i.e., the first one.  
Or perhaps there are liberation theologians who embrace LT but who take metaphorical 
meanings that outstrip their propositional content to be indispensable to the way that 
theology must methodologically convey freedom from oppression.  Such a construal 
would be incompatible with AT in virtue of being inconsistent with one of the stylistic 
prescriptions it adopts from analytic philosophy, i.e., P3. Something similar might be said 
for a range of possible construals we might give to AT that would contradict LT as 
defined above.25 
 
But potential inconsistencies of that kind do not show that LT per se is necessarily 
incompatible with AT per se, only that on some narrow range of construals, LT is 
incompatible with AT.  There is thus no apparent logical incompatibility preventing 
analytic theologians from engaging in LT.  Why, then, are there so few, if any, 
proponents of AT who also embrace LT?  I doubt that proponents of AT are unaware of 
LT as a live option in academic theology.26  Rather, I suspect that proponents of AT fail 
to engage with or in LT principally because they misconstrue LT as engaged in an 
enterprise aimed at the moral or ethical consequences of Christian theology rather than as 
theology per se, or because they recognize LT’s claim that a liberative ambition is an 
obligatory norm for (good) Christian theology per se, but regard that claim as obviously 
false.  One might see how we could properly motivate a substantive and methodological 
commitment to a liberative ambition in theology as reasonable or permissible, but it 
seems prima facie implausible to suppose that Christian theologians in general, or 
analytic theologians as such are under any sort of obligation to adopt that ambition as 
constitutive of (good) Christian theology.  There are, after all, plenty of truths about 
Christian theism other than its liberative dimension for which true explanatory theories 
appear to be perfectly well-motivated.  Granting even the weaker version of LT, there is 
no apparent reason to suppose, for example, that whether or not God is a metaphysical 
simple makes much (if any) difference for human liberation, but it seems absurd to 
                                                        
25 In private correspondence, Rea suggests a possible contradiction between a construal of AT as 
prizing “objectivity” and the anti-liberative dimensions of that notion as suggested in Sally Haslanger, “On 
Being Objective and Being Objectified, in Resisting Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
35-82.    
26 Still, this tends to be mere awareness.  One observes a general ignorance among analytic 
theologians about the landscape and content of LT as a research agenda, and likewise, a general ignorance 
amongst proponents of LT about AT as a research agenda.    
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suppose that a true explanatory theory of divine simplicity would thus be an instance of 
bad theology.  Moreover, any attempt to make a doctrine of divine simplicity satisfy a 
liberative criterion would seem at best a strange (at worse, a tortured) use of that doctrine, 
and this makes it seem bizarre to require that it satisfy that criterion in order to be 
considered (good) Christian theology.   
 
If this diagnosis is correct – that AT (not formally, but as an active research 
program) has sidestepped LT either out of misunderstanding or out of a lack of 
confronting any plausible argument for it – then the goal of including LT within the 
ambit of AT would be well-served by offering a construal of LT that satisfies the 
following three desiderata.  First, such a construal would have to make clear what it is 
that makes LT a meta-theological proposal about the proper content and method of 
Christian theology rather than merely an instance of normative ethics.  Second, such a 
construal would have to challenge the underlying intuition about LT’s obvious falsity that 
enables theologians to dismiss or neglect it as a serious meta-theological proposal.  While 
such a desideratum doesn’t demand a full-blown defense of LT it does seem to demand a 
plausible story about what makes a liberative ambition a necessary criterion for (good) 
Christian theology, and why instances of theological theorizing that do not satisfy that 
criterion merit the negative evaluation that the proponent of LT assigns to them.  Finally, 
since such a construal is aimed at developing LT as a research program of AT, we should 
be able to see how it satisfies both the analytic ambitions of AT as well as broadly 
exemplifying its stylistic prescriptions P1-P5.   
 
The remainder of the paper aims to offer a construal of LT that satisfies all three 
desiderata. My claim is essentially that any ambition of providing true explanatory 
theories in Christian theology (Rea’s analytic ambition ii) must be guided by values 
beyond the narrowly epistemic that determine the relative cognitive and practical 
significance of theological explananda and explanata – and this is so however one 
prefers to theorize the nature of epistemic value per se.  In the second section below, I 
offer a philosophical framework for thinking about how various sorts of values might 
impinge one another in normatively guiding our practices.  In a third section, I make the 
case that the particular configuration of epistemic and non-epistemic values for the 
practice Christian theology that obligates Christian theologians, including Christian 
analytic theologians, to be guided in their theory-construction by the moral and prudential 
value of the liberation for the socially and politically oppressed.  I go on in a fourth 
section to elaborate some of the constraints on content and method in theology that we 
might expect to find if we construe Christian theology as in part constituted by its 
liberative value as LT claims.  As the specification of a meta-epistemological normative 
constraint on the scope and limits of our power to obtain theological knowledge, LT 
therefore also satisfies Rea’s ambition i.  Having thus shown how the liberation 
theologian can make a case for LT that appeals to the ambitions constitutive of AT and in 
a style consistent with AT, I conclude with some brief suggestions about what an analytic 
theology of liberation as a research program of AT might involve.   
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2  Values and Reasons for Acting: Pro Tanto vs. All things Considered  
 
On Rea’s analysis, AT is theological inquiry guided by the analytic ambition of 
seeking to “provide such true explanatory theories as we can.”27 Since AT is just “the 
activity of approaching theological topics with the ambitions of an analytic 
philosopher,”28 the analytic theologian is therefore someone who approaches the subject 
matter of Christian theology not only with the resources of analytic philosophy but also 
its aim of providing true explanatory theories regarding that subject matter.  The 
proponent of LT can accept this minimal conception of the aim of theological theorizing, 
but liberation theologians would regard it as an insufficient specification of that goal.   
On the weaker reading of LT, a necessary condition of any theological theory’s being a 
good theological theory is that it aims not merely at truth, but also at justice for the 
socially and politically oppressed.  How might one go about motivating and defending 
that claim?   
 
I think a case for LT can be made on the basis of a commonly held view in 
contemporary analytic epistemology that, as in ethics or aesthetics so too in 
epistemology, the right is grounded in the good.29 Our epistemic permissions and 
obligations, whatever they are, are grounded in epistemic value in a parallel sort of way 
that aesthetic, moral or prudential duties are respectively grounded in aesthetic, moral or 
prudential value. If it is true that we have a moral obligation not to commit genocide, then 
this is because genocide is morally bad, and mutatis mutandis for prohibitions arising 
from aesthetic and prudential badness.  Similarly, if we are morally permitted (but not 
morally obligated) to pursue a graduate degree, then this is because getting a graduate 
degree is not morally bad, and mutatis mutandis for permissions arising from aesthetic 
and prudential not-badness.  Likewise, if we have an epistemic obligation to avoid 
falsehood and pursue truth in our beliefs, this is because false beliefs are epistemically 
bad, and if we are epistemically permitted, but not required, to ignore certain kinds of 
evidence, this is because ignoring it is not epistemically bad.  
 
The various kinds of norms governing our beliefs and practices are not merely 
grounded in absolute values of good and bad, but also in comparative values of better and 
worse.  For example, if from a moral standpoint we have an obligation to prefer the 
cultivation of virtue to mere continence, then this is because, considered from that 
standpoint, virtue is better than mere continence.  If from an aesthetic standpoint we have 
an obligation to prefer a Picasso to a Kincaid, then this is because, considered from that 
standpoint, the Picasso is aesthetically better than the Kincaid.  On the other hand, if we 
are aesthetically permitted to prefer whichever we like or neither, then it is because one is 
                                                        
27 Rea, “Introduction,” 4. 
28 Ibid., 7. 
29 Of course, the common view has been challenged.  See, e.g., Charles Cote-Bouchard, “Is 
Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?” Dialogue 56/3 (2017): 407-430. My argument in favor of LT can 
therefore be interpreted as establishing only a conditional claim, “if the common view is correct, then 
Christian theologians ought to be committed to LT.”   Nevertheless, in order to avoid the cumbersome 
intrusion of constant conditional qualification, I simply proceed henceforth as if the more commonly held 
view were correct.   
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not objectively better than the other from the aesthetic point of view.  Likewise, if from 
an epistemic standpoint we have an obligation to prefer the acquisition of true beliefs by 
way of knowledge rather than, say, luck, this is because, considered from that standpoint, 
knowledge is epistemically better than merely true belief. If it is epistemically 
permissible to believe either truths of trivial existential import or truths of great 
existential import, this is due to the fact that neither class of truths is better than the other, 
considered from an epistemic point of view.  
 
Finally, in our failure of conformity to the norms grounded in the relevant values, 
we are subject to blame from these corresponding evaluative standpoints.  Our 
accountability to the norms rationally afforded us by these various kinds of value consists 
minimally in our responsibility to avoid blameworthiness in what we think, say and do.  
Our failing to respond to the prohibition on genocide rationally afforded by its badness 
makes us morally blameworthy.  Where the pursuit of virtue is morally preferable to the 
pursuit of mere continence, we can become morally culpable for eschewing virtue in 
favor of mere continence.  Likewise, for most ordinary adults, believing that the moon is 
made of cheese is blameworthy from an epistemic point of view insofar as it involves 
some culpable failure to respond to the epistemic badness of that belief (i.e., its being 
false or epistemically unjustified); if not, believing it is epistemically blameless.30  
 
We can thus recognize a structural parallel between various kinds of goodness, 
the corresponding kinds of norms fixed by them, and our rational accountability to those 
norms.  But the way that these distinct kinds of value and their corresponding norms 
impinge upon us in our practices is not neatly distributed.  Virtually nothing we think, say 
or do matters in only one kind of way (e.g., morally but not epistemically, prudentially, 
aesthetically, or aesthetically but not morally, prudentially, epistemically, etc.). 
Accordingly, virtually nothing we think, say or do is responsive to only one class of 
normative reasons or subject to appraisal from only one evaluative point of view.  Rather, 
most of the practices we choose to undertake exhibit a complex profile of distinct 
respects in which such practices are good and bad, and a corresponding complex of 
comparative considerations about which among these goods are most worth having and 
thus which normative considerations fix our permissions and obligations.   
 
Because of the multi-dimensional value profile of any given course of action we 
might undertake, the various normative considerations that guide our acting (or refraining 
from acting) can be related to one another in different sorts of ways.  What we have 
reasons to do given one dimension of value, pro tanto (i.e., as far as that value is 
concerned) might agree with what we have reasons to do given another distinct 
dimension of value, also considered pro tanto.  For example, under certain circumstances, 
                                                        
30 There are many complications here about the nature of culpability connected to the notion of 
rational affordance.  Should we think of such affordances in internalist or externalist terms?  Should we 
think of them as defeasible or not?  Is our doxastic blameworthiness dependent on that which is within our 
voluntary control?  Do different classes of norms merit different answers to these questions and thus 
different analyses of culpability?  Etc.  I don’t intend to prejudge on any of these questions.  It is enough for 
my purposes that each distinct sort of value imposes a corresponding sort of norm and that each distinct 
sort of norm imposes a corresponding basis of rational evaluation for our beliefs and practices.   
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it might be that my deciding to go to a baseball game is not a morally, aesthetically, 
epistemically or prudentially bad thing to do, while deciding not to go would also not be 
bad in any of those respects.  Thus, all things considered, I can rightly regard my going or 
not going to the baseball game as permissible from every evaluative point of view.  In 
cases like this, where one evaluative point of view would guide us to act in the same way 
as any another, the permissibility of acting considered from one evaluative point of view 
in isolation from the other dimensions of value (i.e., considered pro tanto) would not be 
affected at all by any further and final consideration of any other dimensions of value that 
might be relevant to the act.   
 
However, in many cases a consideration of what we are permitted or obligated to 
do from only one evaluative standpoint, pro tanto, is insufficient for discerning what our 
duties are.31  For example, suppose there is someone who is being severely and unjustly 
harmed by my boss and that I am the only person in a position to expose the injustice and 
prevent further harm.  But I am also the primary breadwinner for my family with no 
prospects for alternative work and exposing my boss would almost certainly damage my 
career, perhaps even getting me fired.  Considered from a purely prudential point of view, 
I ought to refrain from exposing my boss due to the prudential badness of putting my 
livelihood in jeopardy, while considered from a purely moral point of view, I ought not 
refrain from exposing my boss due to the moral badness of becoming complicit in an 
injustice.  My exposing my boss could be regarded as prudentially blameworthy but 
morally blameless while the reverse is true for my refraining from doing so.  
 
Given the conflict in normative considerations generated by the value-profile of 
my action, knowing what I am permitted or obligated to can in this way depend on 
knowing which value ought to trump the other in guiding my actions, and this is a matter 
of knowing which sort of outcome ultimately matters more.  In order to resolve the 
dilemma about exposing my boss I must determine which is the more important aim to 
achieve – the prudential aim of preserving my job or the moral aim of preventing the 
injustice.  To take a less controversial example: suppose I have an idiosyncratic and 
overwhelming hatred for wet shoes but also recognize a moral obligation to help people 
in need, and I subsequently encounter a child who is drowning but whom I cannot help 
without getting my shoes wet.  The prudential badness of wet shoes might give me a pro 
tanto prudential reason to suppose that I ought not help the child, but it does not give me 
an all things considered reason to refrain from helping.  Rather, taking the relative 
badness of wet shoes as compared with dead children into account, I should obviously 
take the moral badness of the latter to outweigh or override the prudential badness of the 
former.  I should aim at moral good of saving the child, my shoes be damned, because the 
moral value of helping is, all things considered, better than the prudential value of dry 
shoes.32   
                                                        
31 See, e.g., Danny Frederick, “Pro-tanto Obligations and Ceteris-parabus Rules,” Journal of 
Moral Philosophy 12/3 (2015): 255-266. 
32 This does not necessarily mean that there is any overarching dimension of value transcending 
moral and prudential value that affords a “commensurating” standpoint from which to compare them, for it 
could also be that there are principled ways in which the norms fixed by moral value include prudential 
considerations, and vice-versa. Compare, e.g., Ruth Chang, “All things considered,” Philosophical 
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More generally, then, when acting or refraining from acting in some way that is 
permissible or favored pro tanto is nevertheless impermissible all things considered, it is 
because the good (or at least not bad) end at which it aims according to one evaluative 
standpoint would nevertheless not be good enough considered from another evaluative 
standpoint so as to override or outweigh the reasons one might have had to act or refrain 
from acting in accordance with one’s merely pro tanto reasons permitting or favoring it.  
This eminently plausible principle accords with our intuitions about the badness, 
wrongness and blameworthiness of acting or refraining from acting in ways that prefer 
what is less valuable or important over that which, by comparison, we have sufficient 
reason to value more, even if the relevant overriding or outweighing value is of a 
different sort.   Nor does the principle require us to hold that genuine goods can conflict 
with one another.  What conflicts is rather the relative preferability of acting on some 
(types of) goods as compared with others.  It might also be that for any possible action 
situation, some sorts of goods (e.g., moral) always override others (e.g., prudential) in 
relative preferability.    
 
 
3. Liberation and the Value of True Explanatory Theories in Theology 
 
The central claim of LT is just that theological inquiry, while accountable to 
epistemic goodness, nevertheless exhibits normative encroachment by other kinds of 
value.  The fact that we are engaged in practices of belief formation aimed at epistemic 
goods of truth, knowledge or understanding does not ensure that those practices are 
entirely unconstrained by moral, aesthetic and prudential considerations as relevant 
factors in our search for truth, knowledge or understanding.   Recognizing the relevant 
kind of encroachment does not require liberation theologians to hold to any substantive 
epistemological theses about, e.g., pragmatic encroachment on knowledge of the sort 
endorsed by Stanley, Hawthorne, Fantl & McGrath, etc.  The claim is not that non-alethic 
considerations might determine whether or not someone may in fact be rightly said to 
possess theological knowledge.  The claim instead is that what we ought to seek to know 
and how we ought to seek to know it in theology must be guided by moral and prudential 
norms over and above epistemic norms, whether or not epistemic norms properly 
understood include some non-alethic considerations.  Considered pro tanto, epistemic 
values are too permissive to determine what we ought to theorize about and how.  
Construing our goal of theory-construction solely in terms of amassing truths or acquiring 
knowledge confronts a practical problem that we could term “the problem of plentitude”: 
there are simply too many truths and thus too much to know about any given subject 
matter we might be inclined to theorize about.   
 
Consequently, in all our knowledge-seeking activities, including that of theory-
                                                        
Perspectives 18/2 (2004): 1-22, and Mathias Sla˚ttholm Sagdahl, “The Argument from Nominal-
Notable Comparisons, ‘Ought All Things Considered,’ and Normative Pluralism,” Journal of Ethics 
18 (2014): 405-425.   
.  
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construction, we must draw on non-epistemic values to determine what we ought and 
ought not theorize about as all things considered normative constraints on the pro tanto 
epistemic permissiveness on of search for truth. For example, consider the project of 
bringing all the speculative and revealed resources of the Christian intellectual tradition 
to bear on the question of which type of flooring God most prefers in a church.  Or 
consider the project of partially explaining the scope and content of divine omniscience 
by successively performing plus-one operations on a random number.  Suppose that for 
each of these projects of knowledge-seeking there is some fact of the matter about what is 
to be explained and that we have sufficient reason to suppose that the means of theorizing 
at our disposal stand a good chance of making the facts we are targeting accessible to us.  
If epistemic value were the only normative consideration for theological theory-choice, 
then both of these projects would be eminently worth pursuing to achieve that goal. 
 
Theological knowledge, like knowledge generally, is not terribly valuable to have 
in and of itself.33  On whatever theory of its intrinsic value you adopt, what makes it 
worth having is its instrumental value for acquiring non-epistemic goods that we care 
about in an overall theory of human flourishing—a theory that coordinates and integrates 
the epistemic, aesthetic, moral and prudential goods constitutive of our cognitive and 
practical lives.  As Ernest Sosa has recently argued, it is not so much the intrinsic value 
of knowledge that makes it worth having, but its instrumentality for a flourishing life.  It 
is only “knowledge of certain matters [that] adds so importantly to the flourishing of 
one’s life individually, and of life in community.”34  Sally Haslanger had developed this 
thought of Sosa’s at least a decade earlier, but highlights both the regulative role that the 
notion of human flourishing plays in the practice of theorizing and the potentially 
controversial nature of that notion:   
 
[G]ood theories are systematic bodies of knowledge that select from the 
mass of truths those that address our broader cognitive and practical 
demands.  In many contexts the questions and purposes that frame the 
project are understood and progress does not require one to investigate 
them. But in other contexts, e.g., especially when debate has seemed to 
break down and parties are talking at cross-purposes, an adequate 
evaluation of an existing theory or success in developing a new one is only 
possible when it is made clear what the broader goals are.35 
 
Like Sosa, Haslanger appeals to a quasi-Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia or 
some conception of the natural, social and political conditions of individual and 
                                                        
33 Notice that this is consistent with holding that all knowledge per se is intrinsically valuable.  It 
is just that, all things considered, we don’t have compelling or overriding reasons to seek knowledge for the 
sake of its merely intrinsic value, irrespective of its practical value.   
34 Ernest Sosa, “Value Matters in Epistemology,” The Journal of Philosophy 107/4 (April, 2010): 
189-190. 
35 Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” 
Noûs 34/1 (2000), 31-55: 35. 
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communal human flourishing.36  Like Sosa, Haslanger recognizes that it is some such 
shared background story about the social and political conditions of human flourishing 
individually and in community that gives us a shared background for determining the 
non-epistemic cognitive and practical goods that encroach on our search for knowledge 
via our doxastic practices of theory-construction.  It is this shared background that 
explains our shared judgments about what would make some true explanatory theories in 
theology (like divine flooring theory or divine number-knowledge theory) not worth 
having as compared with, say a theory about why God allows evil to exist in the world.   
 
But unlike Sosa, Haslanger also recognizes that what counts as the cognitive and 
practical goods that guide what we should judge to be comparatively better and worse 
matters for theologically theorizing, what we ought therefore to prefer to theologically 
theorize about, and what we are thus blameworthy for failing to prefer theorizing about – 
are often a matters of dispute.  LT is predicated on the fact that we need to know, 
broadly, what non-epistemically matters and also what matters more and less in order to 
know how to construct and evaluate all things considered good theories in theology.  But 
it also contends for a particular substantive claim about what in some sense matters 
most—social and political oppression matters in such a way as to outweigh or override 
other competing non-epistemic goods that might guide our search for truth, knowledge or 
understanding in theology.   
 
LT’s criticism of “traditional” theology as “bad” theology is not only that it 
neglects the importance of freedom from oppression as an essential moral and prudential 
constraint on giving true explanatory theories in theology.  Rather, the worry is that much 
traditional theology is undergirded by an assumed or implicit eudaimonistic background 
that it fails to acknowledge and critically examine.  Some such background picture of 
human flourishing is bound to be highly contestable while also determining what sorts of 
theological theory-construction are deemed most worth pursuing.  By failing to identify 
or critically interrogate the values that guide theory-choice, it is often unclear just what 
the cognitive or practical goals are that make a good deal of traditional AT worth doing, 
even if it were to yield true explanatory theories.  This is one way of understanding a 
trope commonly expressed by liberation theologians in criticism of a kind of 
“scholasticism” in theology.  The “scholastic disposition” as described by sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu is just that sharply divorcing the task of theorizing from our moral and 
prudential interests in what we are theorizing about.37  While questionably connected to 
the medieval movement of theology from the monastery into the school, theologians such 
as J. Kameron Carter and Willie Jennings who appeal to Bourdieu to criticize a 
“scholastic disposition” in theology are not so much criticizing any particular historical 
conception of theology as a theoretical rather than practical science.  Rather, they are 
criticizing a tendency to neglect the activity of theologizing itself as one necessarily 
                                                        
36 Haslanger, “What Knowledge is and What it Ought to Be,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 
(1999): 471.   
37 See Willie James Jennings, The Christian Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011), 7; J. Kameron Carter, Race: A Theological Account (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 
373.  Pierre Bourdieu, “The Scholastic Point of View,” Cultural Anthropology 5/4 (1990): 380-91.   
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shaped by the practical concerns of our eudaimonistic interests, and encouraging us 
instead to theorize what it is to do theology “on the basis of …a non-practical point of 
view founded upon the neutralization of practical interests and practical stakes.”38  In 
contrast, LT consists in recognizing that, as Michael Eric Dyson puts it, “learning takes 
place in a world of trouble,” imposing on our knowledge-seeking an explicit 
accountability to non-epistemic goods and non-epistemic virtues.39  Since our 
knowledge-seeking takes place against the background of the cognitive and practical 
interests and stakes associated with our flourishing as individuals and in community—
interests and stakes thoroughly shaped by unjust and oppressive social arrangements—the 
scholastic disposition to prefer the pro tanto epistemic permissiveness of theological 
knowledge-seeking to transcend these actual non-epistemic demands on our theorizing is 
unjustified, all things considered.   
 
For the practice of, say, theoretical physics, or pure mathematics, the non-
epistemic interests and stakes in our knowledge-seeking seem to be clearly contextual 
rather than constitutive constraints on our theorizing—immorality among mathematicians 
might corrupt the practice of mathematical theorizing, but it does not necessarily corrupt 
the content of mathematical theory.40  Similarly, liberation theologians have likewise 
thought it important to identify practical interests as contextually guiding theology.  Thus, 
whereas analytic theologians in thrall to the scholastic disposition have attempted to offer 
true explanatory theories about the divine nature on the basis of, e.g., perfect being 
theology, liberation theologians have responded by critiquing the practical interests 
served by those theories, including the ways in which such theories might historically and 
presently function as technologies of oppression for, e.g., women, sexual minorities, 
                                                        
38 Bourdieu, 383.  I suspect that the scholastic fallacy as a problem of performative contradiction is 
a good way of understanding Haslanger’s critique of, e.g., sexist knowledge attributions as a performative 
problem of the “utterance conditions” rather than truth-conditions of our speech, wherein we engage in 
performative utterances that contradict our assumed background commitments to, e.g., equality, autonomy, 
etc.  See Haslanger, “What Knowledge Is and Ought to Be,” 463-465.  Despite the intuitive appeal of 
seeing some kind of performative contradiction involved in analyzing beliefs constitutive of religious 
practice from a standpoint that ignores the practical constraints on truth-seeking, some further work would 
need to be done to clarify what the charge of performative incoherence amounts to.   For some useful 
analyses on that, see José Antonio Errázuriz, “The Performative Contradiction as an Argumentative 
Device: An Analysis of its Reach and Scope,” Logique et Analyse 225 (2014): 15-44; Jaakko Hintikka, 
“Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?” The Philsophical Review 71/1 (Jan. 1962): 3-32; Eric 
Dayton, “Pragmatic Contradiction,” Ethics 87/3 (April 1977): 222-236.   
39 Quoted in Carter,  376.   
40 See Elizabeth Anderson, “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist 
Epistemology”: “Is physics a ‘pure’ science? In the twentieth century, a highly significant question for 
physics has been: under what conditions will a mass of fissionable material enter into an uncontrolled 
nuclear reaction? This question is significant only because states of have conceived a political interest in 
building nuclear weapons and have funded most research in physics with military ends in mind.  Is even 
number theory a ‘pure’ science? A significant question in number theory includes: what algorithms can 
rapidly factor very large numbers? This question is significant only because states and businesses have 
political and commercial interest in constructing and decoding encrypted messages.  There is no clear way 
to isolate a special subset of sciences or fields of inquiry in which no such interests play a role in defining 
significance, and hence in which no such interests play a role in theory choice” (43).    
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those with disabilities and people of color.41  Most often, the rejoinder to critiques like 
that is that even if, e.g., divine power has been associated with male power in a way that 
has proven disastrous for women, this is theologically irrelevant just insofar as it may 
nevertheless be true that a divine being is necessarily omnipotent.  Liberationist 
criticisms, it is alleged, name a historically contingent fact about a classical conception of 
divine omnipotence, namely that such a conception happens to have been put to bad 
use—a fact that is independent of and hence irrelevant to the question of its truth.   
 
Indeed, there are liberation theologians who take the moral or prudential badness 
of traditional perfect being theology to be evidence of its epistemic badness as well, and 
who therefore go looking for alternative theories of God.  But even if the inference from 
moral and/or prudential badness to epistemic badness is itself epistemically bad,42 it does 
not follow that the moral and prudential badness is irrelevant.  True, it is irrelevant for 
our all things considered view of the truth of, e.g., perfect being theology.  Still, it might 
be highly relevant for revising our all things considered view of the importance of 
engaging in perfect being theology, or the moral and practical value of engaging in it in 
one way rather than another.  If a theologian holds or assumes a picture of human 
flourishing that is significantly undermined by the relevant moral or prudential badness of 
a true explanatory theory in theology, then this might give that theologian a pro tanto 
reason for revising her interests in pursuit of that theory.  If the relevant theory is some 
species of perfect being theology that has been weaponized against the flourishing of 
women, this might rationally require her to make more explicit the patriarchal interests 
and stakes in our pursuit of perfect being theology.  The chequered history of perfect 
being theology as a means for comprehending or worshipping God in Western 
Christianity might even afford her a decisive reason to move away from traditional ways 
of theorizing divine perfection as something worth doing in theology, or at any rate 
something worth doing independently of or at the expense of the limited epistemic 
resources we might devote to theologically theorizing the liberation of women from the 
church’s misuse of divine omnipotence.   
 
All things considered, therefore, it is our eudaimonistic interests that govern our 
                                                        
41 See, for example, William Jones, Is God a White Racist? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); Anna 
Mercedes, Power For: Feminism and Christ’s Self-Giving (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).   
42  Though I also believe that the matter is not so simple as it is sometimes made to appear.  The 
inference from moral or prudential badness to epistemic badness in theology often functions against the 
background of some assumptions about the semantic/pragmatic interface of theological language, and 
divine intentions in self-revelation.  If the meaning and use of theological terms/sentences are inextricably 
linked (e.g., if their aptness for certain uses figures into the satisfaction conditions of those terms or truth-
conditions of those sentences), then maybe the inference from moral/prudential badness to epistemic 
badness goes through.  Similarly, suppose divine self-revelation is given for the sake of the creation of a 
particular kind of community, but that there is no evidence that an understanding of God as construed in the 
classical tradition can properly motivate or generate the requisite sort of community, while there is a lot of 
evidence that such an understanding of God discourages the requisite kind of community.  That would 
seem to count as evidence against a classical understanding of God.  Perhaps the linguistic as well as the 
revelatory arguments that liberation theologians sometimes make and sometimes assume face insuperable 
difficulties.   Still, those arguments and assumptions should be engaged rather than ignored or cavalierly 
dismissed.  
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practices of theological knowledge-seeking, and that those interests include not only 
whatever it is that epistemic value contributes to our flourishing individually and in 
community, but also whatever non-epistemic moral, prudential and aesthetic values 
contribute to our flourishing.  Whatever sort of eudaimonism serves as a guiding norm in 
our search for true explanatory theories in theology, therefore, our practice of theorizing 
must attend to the ways that our (true) theological theories might or do in fact practically 
undermine our eudaimonistic interests.  “Good” theology is not merely epistemically 
good theology but eudaimonistically good theology.  Still, why think that social and 
political oppression takes any kind of privileged place as a criterion for meeting an all 
things considered eudaimonistic constraint on theological knowledge-seeking?  There are 
plenty of possible ways of thinking about a theological picture of human flourishing 
individually and in community on which freedom from social and political oppression in 
this life is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of that flourishing.  Still, I think 
liberation theologians can plausibly hold that freedom from social and political 
oppression is not merely a contextual value of Christian theology but also a constitutive 
one, a defining feature of its subject matter. 
 
 
4. Liberation as Subject Matter and Method of Christian Theology  
 
Liberation theologians have by and large recognized the disagreement that arises 
regarding the significance of social and political oppression in this life that they require 
as a minimally adequate specification of the eudaimonism that normatively constrains 
theological knowledge-seeking.  To do Christian theology, however, means that one’s 
theory-choice and what one deems worthy of pursuing theologically must be consistent 
with (and, perhaps, justified with reference to) a minimally Christian conception of 
human flourishing, individually and in community.  Relying on a Christian conception of 
eudaimonistic goodness in our theory of the eudaimonistic goodness of theological 
theorizing admits of a benign kind of epistemic circularity,43 in a similar sort of way that, 
e.g., Plantinga supposes that we must rely on a Christian conception of the epistemic 
goodness of Christian belief in our theory of the epistemic goodness of Christian belief.44   
 
There is, it seems to me, a good case to be made that the amelioration of social 
and political oppression in the present life is a crucially important and thematically 
central feature of a Christian picture of human flourishing individually and in 
community.  I won’t offer any full-blown case for that here, but just mention a few 
significant reasons to think it plausible.  A Christian story of God’s creation and 
redemption of the world is essentially structured by a “problem/solution” paradigm in 
which the problem centers on the fall of humanity from a place of cooperative caretaking 
over the portion of creation to which human life is bound. The vocation of humanity that 
                                                        
43 See William P. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 
(1986). Reprinted in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989): 319-349; Michael Bergmann, "Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and 
Benign," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-727. 
44  See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).    
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defines its flourishing in the Edenic ideal of Genesis is that of human individuals in 
community mirroring, representing or “imaging” God’s own care for the created order by 
cooperatively caring for it.  Essentially constitutive of our flourishing qua images, 
therefore, is our capacity to mediate divine care in our mutually dependent relations with 
one another, and in our cooperative nurture of land and non-human life.  The human 
“Fall” interrupts not only human life but introduces a breech in the created order, one that 
involves a devolution and aberration of our relationship with God.  This broken 
relationship is evidenced primarily by our failure of mutual dependence on and 
cooperation with one another and our consequent abuse of one another, land, and non-
human creatures.   
 
The principal human expression of this breech with God and nature, in Christian 
Scripture, is social and political enmity, oppression and violence, which is equated with 
an alienation from divine judgment and a moral “pollution” of land.  God’s work of 
redemption on that story is therefore a work primarily aimed at the restoration of a 
renewed form of human community freed from these material distortions of human life.  
The vision of that freedom is just the “kingdom of God” – a form of divine ordering of 
human social and political life within which human mediation of divine caretaking for 
one another and non-human creation is recovered.  That vocation is what is embodied by 
God’s redemption of Israel and ordering of its social and political life by the promise of 
the Law, which had as its intended end the recovery of the Edenic ideal, and fulfilled in 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, through whom God has recovered that ideal.  The 
church, Christians have held, is the community that bears witness to the realization of 
God’s social and political ideal for humanity in the present as a kind of “preview” of the 
eschatological completion of that ideal that awaits us in the age to come.  Christian social 
identity and practice is essentially oriented by this “already” and “not yet” of divine 
redemption for which God’s victory over sin and death has already been partially and 
imperfectly realized in Christ’s present presence and agency for the church while also not 
yet consummated in the restoration of the world that awaits Christ’s return.   
 
On this picture eudaimonia given in a Christian story of creation and redemption, 
we ought to place a high relative importance in our theological theorizing about the 
subject matter of our present and future liberation from social and political oppression.  
The significance of social and political oppression in this life for a Christian 
eudaimonism is a function of its significance in the “already” of this story—the mission 
of the church to enact a present-day preview of the form of communal life it awaits in the 
age to come.  Accordingly, to justify LT’s privileging of liberation from social and 
political oppression in this life as a substantive all things considered requirement for good 
theology, liberation theologians need only show that this mission centrally involves 
attention to social and political conditions of liberation and oppression.  Thus Cone, for 
example, argues that the rescue of Israel from slavery in Egypt and Jesus’ proclamation 
of God’s rescue of the poor and marginalized in the Gospels are not incidental to the 
Christian Gospel, but partially constitutive of it.45   
 
                                                        
45 Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 2-4.  
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Other liberation theologians similarly point to Paul’s proclamation of the 
reconciliation of all people in Christ, and the overcoming of the enmity of ethnic, 
economic, gendered, and sexual identities evinced by the ruling powers of the present age 
as points to be plotted along the same trajectory (in, e.g., Gal. 3:28).  As Paul puts it in 
Galatians, it is “for freedom that Christ set us free” (Gal. 5:1).  Many also rely on the 
prophetic tradition of the Old Testament witness, which demands what Latin American 
liberation theologians identify as a “preferential option for the poor,”46 and condemns 
nationalistic fantasies, even when they are Israelite.  While Israelite and Christian 
communities across the Scriptural witness do not always properly proclaim or live up to 
the conceptual or material requirements of the liberative trajectory set by Scripture itself, 
that trajectory is what God intends for the Church in its continuation of Jesus’s 
proclamation of “good news” to the poor, the marginalized, the victims of injustice at the 
hands of worldly systems of power.   
 
Suppose that the liberation theologian’s construal of Christian eudaimonism is 
right.  That would mean not just that Christians have a unique interest in identifying those 
who suffer oppression in this life and articulating the hope of freedom as realizable 
through the present victory of Christ in and through Christian community, but also that 
this vocation is of central importance to Christian identity and practice per se.  Thus, 
while it could be that there are other ways in which the practice of theological theorizing 
might contribute to human flourishing on a Christian conception of what that means—our 
theorizing could very well be an expression of worship, contemplative prayer, or 
cognitive intimacy with the Lord47—these goods might be overridden or outweighed by 
theorizing that serves the interests of the oppressed.   In the absence of theorizing in 
conformity to the “Great Inversion” of Jesus that exalts the lowly and humbles the pride 
of the powerful, Christian theological theorizing might be a form of worship on par with 
the Temple sacrifices of those who refuse to do justice: a stench in the divine nostrils 
(Amos 5:21-27).   
 
So on the appropriate background picture of human flourishing Christians might 
regard liberation from social and political oppression to be a “substantive” criterion for 
good theology, a normative constraint on theological theory choice that prefers theories 
that serve the interest of liberation over those that don’t.  But this does not require 
liberation theologians to hold that we ought not theorize about matters that seem only 
distantly related to the identification of the oppressed or a specification of the conditions 
for proclaiming and enacting as God’s people Christ’s liberation for them.  Rather, it just 
that any non-liberative subject matter of our theorizing faces a kind of justificatory 
burden about what makes its putative deliverances worth knowing.  Whether God in fact 
possesses any of the attributes classically ascribed to divinity, whether libertarian 
                                                        
46 See Singh, 551-563; Zoë Bennett, “‘Action is the life of all’: the praxis-based epistemology of 
liberation theology,” in Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, edited by Christopher Rowland 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39-54; Gerald West, “The Bible and the poor: a new way 
of doing theology,” ibid., 159-182. 
47 See Marilyn McCord Adams, “What’s Wrong with the Ontotheological Error?” Journal of 
Analytic Theology 2 (May, 2014): 1-12; Paul J. Griffiths, The Practice of Catholic Theology (Washington, 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 24-26.   
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freedom exists, etc. may well turn out to be of great importance in light of a Christian 
conception of human flourishing.  Proclaiming good news to the poor on a Christian 
conception of what that means may require a proper understanding of the asymmetric 
divine accessing relations between the human and divine natures of Jesus.48 But 
according to LT, much AT mistakenly proceeds simply as if the all things considered 
importance of any such projects is either self-evident, or immaterial to the permissibility 
of pursuing them.   
 
If Christian theologians ought to prefer to offer theories about God and God’s 
relation to the world that appropriately reflect the central eudaimonistic importance of 
God’s liberating activity in the world, then it would be practically incoherent or self-
defeating to adopt a strategy of theorizing that runs contrary to God’s liberating activity 
in the world.  It is something like taking up the game of chess with a strategy—whether 
out of refusal or ignorance—that undermines the norm that defines the goal and purpose 
of playing the game in the first place.  While there might be many possible ways that 
such an ignorance or refusal might be realized, there is a wide range of ways that are 
entirely consistent with a conformity to the rules of permissible movement for each piece, 
such as, e.g., trying to lose each of one’s pieces as quickly as possible.  Likewise, there 
are potentially many ways that one might fail or refuse to do Christian theology in 
conformity to the non-epistemic goods internal to it that guide theological theorizing, 
while nevertheless being faithfully guided by its epistemic goods.  It is in virtue of a 
recognition of this fact that LT places not only a substantive but also a methodological 
constraint on Christian theology.  Miranda Fricker highlights two ways that social and 
political oppression might impose itself on the practice of offering true explanatory 
theories that are especially relevant for Christian theology as construed by LT.  First, she 
emphasizes the intuitive idea, grounded in Marx but developed more recently especially 
by Lukacs, that  
 
a life led at the sharp edge of any given set of power relations provides the 
critical understanding (of the social world, in the first instance) where a life 
cushioned by the possession of power does not… [S]ocial identity and 
power relations…may influence epistemic access to the world.49  
 
If we ought to be guided in our theorizing about God and God’s relation to the world by 
our eudaimonistic interest in the comparative importance of God’s liberating activity for 
the oppressed, then our ability to evaluate or assess the significance of our explanatory 
theories for a Christian liberative ambition will depend on our epistemic access to the 
relevant facts about liberation for the oppressed.  We will need to know, for example, 
what sorts of oppression human suffer, where and how the effects of that oppression is 
registered in our cognitive and practical lives, and how central loci of theological interest 
                                                        
48  Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 106.   
49 Miranda Fricker, “Feminism in Epistemology: Pluralism without Postmodernism,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, edited by Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 147.  See also Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose 
Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).   
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are connected to God’s liberating activity as it is, e.g. grounded in the divine nature, 
enacted in God’s creation, providence, election, incarnation, and manifest in the life of 
the Church. But as Fricker notes, epistemic access to facts such as these is not evenly 
distributed – not everyone is in an equally good position to identify or evaluate them.   
 
Whatever else it might mean to belong to an oppressed group as a woman, a 
sexual minority, a person of color, a person with a disability, a person of a lower socio-
economic class, or some intersection of these, it is to occupy a particular kind of social 
position, what Harding calls “‘nodes’ of historically specific social practices and social 
meanings that mediate when and how suffering occurs for such socially constructed 
persons.”50 Harding explains the kind of relative advantage and disadvantage of epistemic 
access to the relevant social and facts about oppression in terms of the non-epistemic 
interests that affect our capacities to notice and attend to those facts.  Thus “members of 
oppressed groups have fewer interests in ignorance about the social order and fewer 
reasons to invest in maintaining or justifying the status quo than do dominant groups.”51 
The flip side of this is that those belonging to privileged groups who benefit from the 
material disadvantages of oppressed groups are very strongly prudentially motivated to 
maintain a kind of insensitivity to the relevant facts that would threaten their relative 
advantages.   
 
Thus, for example, in speaking about racial identity, Charles Mills has famously 
drawn our attention to the “cognitive and moral economy psychically required for 
conquest, colonization, and enslavement,” as a kind of “consensual hallucination” that 
“precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of all social realities.”52  The 
infrastructure of social meanings and relations constitutive of racial identity, Mills 
argues, has systematically distorting cognitive effects on the racially privileged (i.e., 
whites), which include “processes of cognition, individual and social” including 
“perception, conception, memory testimony, and motivational group interest.”53  
“Oppressors,” Cone says, “never like to hear the truth in a socio-political context defined 
by their lies.”54  Those non-whites who are oppressed precisely by this consensual or 
structurally reinforced ignorance of white social position, on the other hand, enjoy a kind 
of privileged access to precisely what whites in virtue of their social position miss.  
Commenting on James Weldon Johnson remark that, “colored people of this country 
know and understand the white people better than the white people know and understand 
them,” Mills observes that  
 
                                                        
50 Harding, 122.  There are important questions about what socially constructed kinds are (e.g., 
whether or not they are a species of natural kind, objective types, or what, as well as how particular group 
kinds should be analyzed), and whether or not social identities are reducible to social positions (as, e.g., 
Haslanger sometimes seems to suggest), but we needn’t pronounce on any of those ontological questions 
for the epistemic consideration I’m interested in here.   
51 Harding, 126.  
52 Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 18-19.    
53 Mills, “White Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, edites by Shannon Sullivan 
and Nancey Tuana (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 23-33.  
54 Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, xvi. 
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Often for their very survival, blacks have been forced to become lay 
anthropologists, studying the strange culture, customs, and mind-set of the 
“white tribe” that has such frightening power over them, that in certain time 
periods can even determine their life or death on a whim.55  
 
But while there is therefore some sense in which oppressed social and political 
identities have a privileged mode of epistemic access to that which Christians ought to 
deem matters of central theological importance, Fricker further points out that, secondly, 
“social identity may constrain participation in epistemic practices—practices of asserting, 
denying, telling, asking, giving reasons, etc.”56 On the one hand, in seeking to provide 
true explanatory theories of any sort one must necessarily engage in such practices, but 
on the other hand those practices are 
 
in large measure interactive, so that a person’s full participation in them 
depends on certain reciprocating background attitudes on the part of fellow 
participants – attitudes which, for instance, provide for the appropriate 
distributions of trust and of credibility.  If relations of gender, class, or race 
cause distortion in these background attitudes, then social identity and 
power have intervened in a manner that can be the concern not merely of 
the sociologist of knowledge, but of the epistemologist.57  
 
For theological inquiry in particular, the two factors that Fricker identifies above work in 
tandem, so that those who are best positioned epistemically to identify the sites of 
theological inquiry that Christian theologians have most reason to prefer, all things 
considered, are the worst positioned to shape the practice of theological inquiry. The kind 
of epistemic “privilege” associated with identifying oppressive social arrangements and 
forms of agency enjoyed by those of disadvantaged social classes also imposes 
corresponding epistemic deficits, such as their acceptance as credible sources of 
testimonial knowledge or interpretive competence. 58  In addition to the potential 
inaccessibility of these epistemic goods, belonging outside a dominant social class can 
also bring with it disadvantages in the ability to identify and access the prudential goods 
required to prosecute the kind of theological inquiry consistent with a Christian 
eudaimonistic interest in that practice.  These considerations go a long way towards 
explaining why it is that the theological market-share of LT tends to be insulated from 
significant engagement with modes of theological inquiry that place comparatively less 
importance on matters of social and political oppression.  As Cone puts it 
 
White theologians wanted me to debate with them about the question of 
whether ‘black theology’ was real theology, using their criteria to decide 
the issue. With clever theological sophistication, white theologians defined 
                                                        
55 Mills, 17-18.  
56 Fricker, 147.  
57 Ibid.  
58 For a detailed account of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as species of epistemic 
injustice, see Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).   
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the discipline of theology . . . [as] unrelated to the problem of slavery and 
racism.  Using a white definition of theology, I knew there was no way I 
could win the debate . . . Racism is a disease that perverts one’s moral 
sensitivity and distorts the intellect . . .They who are responsible for the evil 
of racism also want to tell its victims whether bigotry is a legitimate subject 
matter of systematic theology… Why then should I spend my intellectual 
energy answering their questions, as if their experience were the only source 
from which theology derives its questions?”59  
 
Cone here reflects on just the situation of asymmetric distribution in epistemic 
and prudential advantages and disadvantages that Fricker analyzes—one that accords the 
most significant regulative control over theological knowledge-seeking to those who 
occupy epistemic positions least well-suited to discern and evaluate the eudaimonistic 
significance of oppression that is partially constitutive of the practice of Christian 
theology.  But even where the more traditional and orthodox research programs of 
theology adopt a more epistemically permissive attitude toward proponents of LT than 
the sort Cone describes, they are often subject to what José Medina (riffing on Hilary 
Putnam)60 calls a “social division of cognitive laziness”—a form of culpable ignorance 
that is justified by a kind of buck-passing under the banner of a disciplinary division of 
labor.61   
 
 As in the substance of theological inquiry, so too for its mode, liberation 
theologians have described this dynamic as an epistemic consequence of the “great 
inversion” of God’s liberating activity.  In the Gospels we find Jesus emphasizing that 
stakeholders in various worldly systems of oppressive power, including religious 
stakeholders, are those who fail to properly discern the theologically trivial from the 
weighty, while it is revealed and accessible to those occupying the vantage of the 
oppressed. As St. Paul memorably puts it: 
 
the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us 
who are being saved it is the power of God. . . Where is the wise person? 
Where is the teacher of the law? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has 
not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the wisdom of 
God the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased 
through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe . . 
. Brothers and sisters, think of what you were when you were called. Not 
many of you were wise by human standards; not many were influential; not 
many were of noble birth.  But God chose the foolish things of the world to 
shame the wise; God chose the weak things of the world to shame the 
strong.  God chose the lowly things of this world and the despised things—
                                                        
59 Cone, xvii-xviii.  
60 Hilary Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 70/19 (1973): 699-711.  
61 José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145-
147.  For a particular analysis of the way this works itself out in philosophy, see Lucius T. Outlaw, “Social 
Ordering and the Systematic Production of Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, 197-211. 
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and the things that are not—to nullify the things that are, so that no one may 
boast before him.62  
 
The unique epistemic access to theological knowledge afforded by one’s 
oppressed social status is just the sort of fact that Fricker identifies and Cone incorporates 
into his approach to theology that gives black voices a privileged methodological place.  
M. Shawn Copeland’s womanist theology identifies this as a kind of “critical cognitive 
praxis” that expresses “subjugated knowledge”63 constitutive of an “ethics of thinking.”  
Copeland develops the idea of a theological “canon” that accords with St. Paul’s analysis 
of Christian theological knowledge-seeking—such an alternative canon of those socially 
and politically deemed lowly is a traditioned expression of a particular kind of mind that 
Paul identifies with the mind of Christ.  “It leads and trains a mind in an appropriation of 
a tradition of epistemic, aesthetic, moral and cultural decisions, priorities, and desires.”64  
Overcoming the coercive epistemic silencing, dismissal and privilege-blindness of non-
liberation theologians who represent socially and politically dominant identities requires 
a retrieval of such a canon that represents the interests of the socially and politically 
oppressed across time and space.65   
 
 
5. Christian AT as LT 
 
Despite the considerable and impressive theological market share that AT has 
acquired in contemporary academic theology, it has by and large failed to engage in or 
with theologies of liberation.  If the case for LT I’ve made above is right, then Christian 
theologians who have become enthusiastic about AT have neglected the “one thing 
needful” in that enthusiasm.  Namely they have not reckoned with a meta-theological 
case for LT, according to which any instance of good theology will be an instance of 
theology substantively and methodologically committed to the cognitive and practical 
importance of serving the interests of the socially and politically oppressed.  My defense 
of LT aims in the first place to be an instance of AT, insofar as it conforms to the 
ambitions of offering a true explanatory theory falling outside the natural sciences, 
illuminates a normative constraint on the scope and nature of our knowledge of the 
world, and does both in a manner that does not obviously violate any of Rea’s stylistic 
prescriptions P1-P5.   But even if it fails as a defense of LT, and as such fails to prompt 
any analytic theologians to take up a theological commitment to LT and produce 
                                                        
62 I Cor. 1:18-30, NIV  
63 M. Shawn Copeland, “A Thinking Margin: The Womanist Movement as Critical Cognitive 
Praxis,” in Deeper Shades of Purple: womanism in religion and society, edited by Stacey M. Floyd-
Thomas (New York: NYU Press, 2006), 227-228.  Copeland’s “subjugated knowledge” approximates 
Harding’s conception of epistemic advantage of the oppressed, Mills’s conception of survivalist 
anthropology, and what Rowan Williams calls the “intelligence of the victim,” in Christ on Trial: How the 
Gospel Unsettles our Judgment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 45-46: “not because it is good or 
holy in itself to be a victim, far from it, but because looking at the world from the point of view of those 
excluded by worldly systems of power frees us from the need always to be securing our own power at all 
costs” (46). 
64 Copeland, 231.    
65 Ibid., 232.   
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exemplary instances of it, the argument might serve to raise a secondary question that I 
find isn’t adequately addressed in the AT literature:  namely, what should we think it is 
that makes theology in general, and AT in particular, worth doing?  Why should we be 
granted the requisite space, time, money, and material and intellectual infrastructure to do 
it?  LT may not be the only viable answer, but any attractiveness it has depends on seeing 
the pressing significance of the question.   
 
So suppose that a large proportion of particularly Christian stakeholders in AT do 
recognize the pressing importance of the question and moreover that it prompts us toward 
the development of a research program in analytic theologies of liberation.  What sorts of 
revisions to the present state of AT would that require?  Arguably, it would require a 
significant revision in the content, the constituency, and the canon of theology as 
standardly construed in AT.  As it presently exists, analytic theologians have not taken up 
theological topics with any demonstrably liberative ambitions with respect to the most 
important forms of social and political oppression that contribute to human misery in our 
lives here below and in via.   
 
To engage AT as LT would require us to remedy this in the subject matter we 
choose to treat and the questions we are seeking to answer by way of our treatments.  
That implies no shift away from theological metaphysics or epistemology toward ethics 
in particular, only a shift in perspective about issues and questions in theological 
metaphysics and epistemology are made especially salient from the standpoint of the 
oppressed.   A shift of that sort, however, would also require a corresponding shift in the 
constituency of AT, which at this moment remains predominantly made up of those 
socially and politically dominant groups and as such remains subject to the systematic 
distortions in the distribution and significance of epistemic and non-epistemic goods that 
order their knowledge-seeking.  Finally, the inclusion of socially oppressed groups, while 
necessary, is insufficient for bringing about the requisite move toward LT apart from 
representing a corresponding change in the sources or canons of theological reflection 
that shape our aims and interests in the practice of theology.66   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
66 As Linda Martín Alcoff points out, it is always possible that “members of oppressed groups also 
have specific reasons to maintain their own ignorance about the social order…But such reasons…may be 
outweighed by the need to know the true reality of the social conditions within which one must survive.” 
See her “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, 43-44.  
